The intrinsic difference elaborated above does not arise...

The intrinsic difference elaborated above does not arise from the mental concepts that constitute our thoughts, but rather from their exemplification that occurs in external objects. For instance, the color black: the variations in blackness pertain to the existential instances of the concept, not to the concept itself. This demonstrates that tashkik (intrinsic gradation) actually pertains to existence, not to essence as such.

In this light, we may affirm the truth of intrinsic gradational variation, although in existence not in essence. Furthermore, those who deny the existence of intrinsic gradational variation based on the reasoning that a single entity cannot at once satisfy contradictory qualities are wrong in that they are confusing numeric singularity with generic singularity.

Their reasoning is correct only in relation to numeric singularity, whereas in generic singularity the simultaneous application of contradictory qualities is possible. From the foregoing discussion we can conclude that a mushakkik is an entity that allows of intrinsic variation so that the difference that distinguishes its instances derives from the very reality that unites them. After having considered these preliminary points, we can now turn to the concept of existence.

The concept of existence as such can be predicated of all objects. The reality of the concept of existence, its external instance, is the locus where objective reality and properties of things obtain.

The external reality of the concept of existence accommodates a variety of opposing qualities and states—necessity and contingence, cause and effect, unity and multiplicity, actuality and potentiality, etc.—and as such is a gradational entity [ mushakkik ] that subsumes a plurality of degrees that vary intrinsically in intensity.

In this light, it becomes clear that those who hold the concept of existence to be ambiguous [ mushtarak lafzi ], reflecting the multiplicity of the essences of which it is predicated, are wrong. For, an essence is in and of itself neutral in regard to existence and nonexistence : According to the definitive judgment of reason, both existence and nonexistence are predicable of an essence.

Now, if the concept of existence were ambiguous, incorporating the meaning of the essence to which it is attributed (as our opponents claim) then to predicate nonexistence of an essence should constitute a contradiction—an obviously unreasonable conclusion.