Is morality therefore nothing more than a collection of...

Is morality therefore nothing more than a collection of cultural norms to be passed on to new citizens-in-the making? And as such, is moral education merely a process by which these cultural norms are passed on to citizens-to-be to ensure their social compliance? McPhail (1982) argues that morality can stand beyond the social norms and therefore include both inculcation into these norms and evaluation and criticism of these.

However, this discussion brings us back to the basic question of why we should be moral in terms of concern for others and their needs, and whether incentives to morality are intrinsic or relate to personal gratification or gain. Determining what is moral is one significant aspect of the debate, but another rests on the notion of whether individuals can be moral.

The concept of moral responsibility rests on the idea that individuals can be held responsible for their actions and therefore be judged as to the morality of these. This presupposes that individuals are free to make choices about their actions. One of the problematical issues in discussing moral responsibility is the extent to which this is the case. Can we really be held morally responsible for our actions?

The notion of being responsible or being held responsible implies that the individual can make choices and decisions unencumbered and without duress, in fact, by exercising free will. The extent to which free will actually exists has occupied philosophers from ancient Greece onwards.

The concept of free will was acknowledged in early Greek texts in terms of ascribing praise or blame to actions and acknowledging that some actions were free of praise or blame (excused) because they were coerced, as the agent’s freedom to choose had been compromised (Eshelmen, 2004). Aristotle theorised that moral responsibility can be judged in individuals who are moral agents and who are able to act voluntarily.

Moral agents are those who have the capacity to make deliberate decisions about their actions, based on their concept of what is ‘good’. Voluntary action implies that the agent chooses to act and is aware of their actions. Eshelman (2004) suggests an ambiguity in Aristotle’s theory, based on the appropriateness of judging others behaviour as moral.