To be sure...

To be sure, they look like questions from the outside, since they seem to satisfy the customary rules of grammar, but in truth they consist of empty sounds, because they transgress the profound inner rules of logical syntax discovered by the new analysis.” (Schlick 1931, pp. 55-56). [^11] Frege (1879), p. [^49]: [^12] Russell 1900, p. 8 [^13] Russell (1905).

[^14] Russell (1914) [^15] Russell formulated the slogan of this practice of analysis: “The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” (Russell 1914, p. 112). The motto subsequently served as the epigraph for Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt.

[^16] Frege’s critique of psychologism about logic, particularly in the Grundlagen (Frege 1884), was anticipated by nineteenth-century philosophical logicians such as Bolzano and Lotze, who had held that the contents of thoughts must be sharply distinguished from the psychological events that lead to their being thought, judged, or entertained. In drawing this distinction, and underlying it with his Platonistic conception of mental contents, Frege most often cited Mill as his polemical target.

Nevertheless, it is not clear that Mill actually held the psychologistic theory that Frege attributed to him; for discussion, see, e.g., Skorupski (1998). Frege’s critique of psychologism was also the basis of his notorious attack on Husserl’s first work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic, in [^1894]: [^17] In 1959, Russell described his initial motivations this way: “It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel.

Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps… I felt … a great liberation, as if I had escaped from a hot house onto a windswept headland. In the first exuberance of liberation, I became a naïve realist and rejoiced in the thought that grass really is green.” (Russell 1959, p. 22).

[^18] The hope to “structuralize” science by showing its logical structure – and thus demonstrate the objectivity of its claims by purging them of any dependence on ‘subjective’ or ‘ostensively indicated’ elements was, in particular, the central ambition of the ‘construction theory’ that Carnap pursued in his influential Der Logische Aufbau der Welt of [^1928]: See, e.g., Carnap (1928), section 16.