[^19] Throughout much of his career...

[^19] Throughout much of his career, Russell insisted that the proper task of philosophy must be the investigation of “the world” rather than language or thought. Prior to 1918, he saw language as “transparent,” and even afterwards he conceived of the task of logical analysis as showing the structure of the world rather than language. (Monk 1997, pp. 38-40) The question of Frege’s relationship to the philosophy of language is equally complex.

For helpful discussions, see Dummett (1981b, chapter 3), Sluga (1997) and Hylton (1990), chapter [^6]: [^20] (Leibniz 1679, p. 8) Compare Frege’s description, in Begriffsschrift, of the powers of his new conceptual notation (Frege 1879, p. 49). [^21] Carnap (1928), section [^3]: [^22] Michael Friedman has convincingly documented the pronounced legacy of post-Kantian philosophy in the logical positivism of Reichenbach,