As a rationalist...

As a rationalist, Sa’adya is also concerned with the limitations of rational methods in order to fully respect the independency of reasoning. Paradoxically then his objection to the qiyas is the result of his rationalistic insistence. The gist of this paradox is the acknowledgment of reason as a valid source of religious knowledge on the one hand, while acknowledging the fundamental identification of the law with the revealed Word of God on the other.

This dialectic invites the heuristic distinction between legal norms which are acquired by reason – rational laws (Ar. ‘ aqliyyāt , Heb. sikhliyot ) – and those given through revelation – revelational laws (Ar. sam’iyyāt , Heb. shimi’yot ).[^47] Sa’adya limits qiyas only to rational laws and denies its relevance for revelational laws.

Hence paradoxically his keen insistence on the validity of human reasoning as source of religious knowledge ultimately reduces the applicability of rational faculties in the framework of religious law. This being so, Sa’adya’s legal theory presents a new perspective on the conceptual meaning of judicial analogy. 3.1 Holistic Jurisprudence and the Intelligibility of the Divine Law Sa’adya’s legal theory is primarily an organic one.

In this world view, in which “no things have existence except by way of combination,” the internal relations among the components of the divine law are not contingent, and in practice they determine the possible manipulations within the law.

The legal theory that Sa’adya presents in the beginning of Kitāb Tahsil Ashar’i’ Asama’iyah[^48] (henceforth: K itab Tahsil ) Sa’adya describes the internal relations within the law by ontological categories - substance and accident - by which he characterizes the relationship between the general rules and particular cases.[^49] From viewing the relationship between the whole and its particulars as essential, Sa’adya derives the principle of ‘unity of knowledge’ or, in his words, “the source of wisdom is one”[^50] or “the root of knowledge is one”.[^51] The significance of this principle may be seen on two levels.

First, knowing the substance as a whole entails knowledge of the substance’s appearances or accidents. Second, the same essential relations between the whole and its particulars also exist between the subject of knowledge and the modes of its cognition: “And that which we said regarding substance and accident also applies to the things that are apprehended by the senses.