Each one of them is apprehended by the same sense by which...

Each one of them is apprehended by the same sense by which its totality is apprehended. There is no sound which is not apprehended by the sense of hearing, nor any color that is not apprehended through the sense of sight.”[^52] This being so, the relation between substance and accidents is the relation between the whole and its parts, and therefore poses a three-fold correlation between the subjects of knowledge, the status of knowledge and the modes of cognition.[^53] This correlation between the metaphysical core of the law and its epistemological modes leads Sa’adya to examine the justification for judicial analogy against the background of the distinction between the rational and the revelational laws.

As mentioned above, Sa’adya establishes his legal theory on the distinction between rational and revelational laws.[^54] The basis of this distinction lies in the idea that the intelligibility of the rational laws is absolutely independent, whereas knowledge of the revelational laws depends on revelation. This distinction apparently touches the very heart of the Sa’adianic attitude towards legal reasoning.

Thus, the negation of the qiyas is an outcome of exhausting the epistemological implications of the distinction between rational and revealed laws. In that respect, Sa’adya’s objection to the use of qiyas with regard to revelational laws strengthens the metaphysical weight of the rational/revelational distinction. Sa’adya’s reflections upon the rational/revelational distinction suggest that its source lies in the fact that different kinds of legal knowledge apply to different kinds of laws.

That is to say, the distinction is not the result of the limitations of human ability to comprehend the laws, but rather of a substantive distinctiveness of the rational laws from those that are revealed. Thus when defining the jurists’ rational activities, such as exegesis ( tawil ), analogy ( qiyas ), and personal preferences ( istihsan ), attention should be paid to the metaphysical set-up of rational and revelational laws and its application should therefore be limited to the rational laws.

Sa’adya disapprovingly portrays the application of revelational laws to new cases by ijtihād or qiyas as separating the particulars from their holistic structure. Applying exegesis to the revelational laws is represented as an arbitrary method that substitutes the original study.