A formal statement of this argument might be constructed as follows...

A formal statement of this argument might be constructed as follows: (1) It is possible that the Christian God exists and it is possible that the Christian God does not exist. (2) If one believes in the Christian God then if he exists then one receives an infinitely great reward and if he does not exist then one loses little or nothing.

(3) If one does not believe in the Christian God then if he exists then one receives an infinitely great punishment and if he does not exist then one gains little or nothing. (4) It is better to either receive an infinitely great reward or lose little or nothing than it is to either receive an infinitely great punishment or gain little or nothing. Therefore: (5) It is better to believe in the Christian God than it is to disbelieve in the Christian God.

(6) If one course of action is better than another then it is rational to follow that course of action and irrational to follow the other. Therefore: (7) It is rational to believe in the Christian God and irrational to disbelieve in the Christian God. Three common objections to this argument will be considered here. A more detailed discussion of each can be found by following the appropriate link. The first of these objections targets the third premise of the argument as it is stated above.

It is the objection that Pascal’s Wager illicitly assumes a Christian view of the criteria for entrance into heaven, i.e. it illicitly assumes that if there are infinite rewards and punishments to be had then they will be distributed on the basis of belief or disbelief in the Christian god.

There are many possible ways in which such rewards and punishments might be distributed; they might be distributed on the basis of belief in the Christian God, or on the basis of good deeds, or on the basis of belief in the Muslim God, for instance. In fact, distribution of heavenly rewards and infernal punishments on almost any basis imaginable appears to be possible.

It is only, however, if such rewards and punishments are distributed on the basis of belief in the Christian God that belief in the Christian God is in our interests. On many of the other possible distributive schemes, it is by disbelieving in the Christian God that one receives a heavenly reward. If any of those distributive schemes were the true scheme, though, then the third premise of Pascal’s Wager would be false.