It would not be the case that if one does not believe in the...

It would not be the case that if one does not believe in the Christian God and the Christian God does not exist then one gains little or nothing, for if such a distributive scheme were the true scheme then one might gain a great deal (i.e. an infinite reward in heaven) by disbelieving in the Christian God.

In order to demonstrate that the third premise of his argument is true, then, the advocate of Pascal’s Wager must demonstrate that the only possible criterion for entrance into heaven is belief in the Christian God and the only possible criterion for entrance into hell is disbelief in the Christian God. This, the objector suggests, cannot be demonstrated, for it is false. The second objection to Pascal’s Wager targets the fourth premise of the argument as it is stated above.

It is the objection that the probability that God exists, and so the probability of either receiving an infinite reward in heaven or of receiving an infinite punishment in hell, is so small that these possible outcomes of belief or disbelief can be discounted. The choice between belief and disbelief is thus taken to be a choice between losing little or nothing and gaining little or nothing.

As it is better to gain little or nothing than it is to lose little or nothing, this objection concludes that it is wagering on atheism, rather than wagering on theism, that is the rational course of action.

It is better, the objection suggests, to take the certain benefits of disbelief (the joys of indulging in sin and of being free from religious commitments) by wagering that God doesn’t exist than it is gamble on the vastly improbable hope of a heavenly reward and almost certainly gain nothing at all. The third objection targets the inference from the fifth and sixth premises to the conclusion. It is the objection that we cannot choose our beliefs.

We form our beliefs on the basis of evidence, not on the basis of desire. No matter how much one may want to believe that a given proposition is true, one cannot bring oneself to do so simply through an act of will. Rather, in order for one to come to believe that a proposition is true one requires evidence for its truth. Pascal’s Wager, though, merely prescribes belief in God; it does not provide any evidence that such a belief would be true.

As such, it asks us to do the impossible: to believe without reason. Wagering on Atheism The second objection to Pascal’s Wager.