Rather...

Rather, the peripatetics often presented and explained philosophical problems in a way which was more compatible with the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness. Explanation of Terms In order to clarify this topic and completely specify the area of controversy it is first necessary to provide explanations of the terms used regarding the problem, and then to precisely determine the purport of the topic and area of conflict.

This problem is usually presented by posing the question of whether existence is fundamental and whatness respectival or whether whatness is fundamental and existence respectival? However, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn himself presented the problem in the following form. Existence possesses objective reality. The implicit purport of this is that whatness does not possess objective reality. Thus, the pivotal expressions of this topic are existence, whatness, fundamentality, respectival, and reality.

However, we have already explained the expression, ‘existence,’ which is sometimes used as an infinitive ( maṣdar ) (to be), and sometimes as a verbal noun ( ism-e maṣdar ) (being), and also sometimes it is used by logicians with a copulative meaning (is). It is clear that in this philosophical discussion the copulative meaning is not under consideration, and likewise the infinitive which indicates a relation between subject and object is not meant.

The meaning of the verbal noun, in the restricted sense of occurrence, is also not meant, unless the above restriction is removed so that it may be predicated of objective realities including the sacred Essence of God. The expression ‘whatness’ ( māhiyyah )which is a contrived infinitive ( maṣdar ja‘lī ) derived from ‘What is it?’ ( mā huwa?

) is used as a philosophic term in the form of a verbal noun ( ism-e maṣdar , ‘what-is-it-ness’) but with the same condition of dissociation from the sense of occurrence, so that it may be predicated of an essence. This term is used in philosophy in two senses, one of which is more general than the other.

The specific sense is defined as “that which is said in answer to the question ‘What is it?’” and naturally it is applied in the case of an existent which can be known by the mind, in technical terms, that which possesses specific limits of existence, which are reflected in the mind in the form of primary intelligibles (whatish concepts).