For this reason it is said that God the Almighty does not have a whatness...

For this reason it is said that God the Almighty does not have a whatness: “There is no whatness of the Necessary Existent.” Proponents of the fundamentality of existence say with regard to the objective reality of existence, “Existence itself has no whatness,” and sometimes that “it does not have an intellectual form.” But the more general sense is defined as ‘that which the thing itself is.’ This includes both the objective reality of existence as well as the sacred Essence of God.

It is in accordance with this meaning that it is said with regard to God Almighty, “The whatness of God is the same as His identity ( innīyyah ).” In this discussion what is meant by the expression ‘whatness’ is the former meaning, not the concept represented by the word whatness itself in the sense of primary predication. Rather the discussion is about the instances of this concept, that is, whatness in the sense of common predication, such as ‘man’.

For the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness also admit that this concept itself is a respectival concept.2 In other words, the discussion is about whatish concepts ( mafāhīm māhuwī ), not the concept of whatness.

The expression ‘fundamentality’ ( aṣālah )which is used with the literal meaning of being a root and is the opposite of ‘ far‘iyyah ’ which has the meaning of being an offshoot in this context, is employed with a specific meaning as the opposite of ‘ i‘tibārī ’ (respectival), and their precise meanings are jointly clarified.

In Lesson Fifteen several technical meanings of the expression i‘tibārī (respectival) were mentioned, according to some of which, even the concept of existence was called a respectival concept. But in this context, the meaning of i‘tibār , being the opposite of aṣīl (fundamental), is different.

The respectival nature of the concept of existence, according to the previous meaning, is compatible with the doctrine of the fundamentality of existence and the ‘respectival’ nature of whatness according to the meaning appropriate to this context.

What is meant by the two opposite concepts of aṣīl and i‘tibārī here pertains to the question as to which of the two, the whatish concepts or the concept of existence, refers to entified reality in itself ( dhātan ) without mediation, in the precise philosophical sense.