Concepts which are predicated of external things are divided into two groups...

Concepts which are predicated of external things are divided into two groups: one group is of those concepts which the mind acquires automatically from specific cases, that is to say, when one or several individual perceptions are obtained by means of the external senses or internal intuitions, immediately the intellect acquires a universal concept of them, such as the universal concept of ‘whiteness’, which is acquired after seeing one or several white things, or the universal concept of ‘fear’, which is acquired after the appearance of specific feelings once or several times.

Such concepts are called whatish concepts or first intelligibles. There is another group of concepts whose abstraction requires mental effort and comparison of things with one another, such as the concepts of cause and effect, which is abstracted by attending to the relevant relation after comparing two things such that the existence of one depends on the other. For example, when we compare fire with the heat which comes from it, we notice the dependence of the heat on the fire.

The intellect abstracts the concept of cause from the fire and the concept of effect from the heat. If there were no attention and comparison, these kinds of concepts would never be obtained. If fire were seen thousands of times, and in the same way if heat were felt thousands of times, but no comparison were made between them, but the appearance of one from the other were not noticed, the concepts of cause and effect would never be obtained.

These kinds of concepts are called ‘philosophical concepts’ or ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles,’ and in technical terms it is said: The occurrence ( ‘arūḍ ) and characterization ( ittiṣāf ) of first intelligibles are both external.2 The occurrence ( ‘arūḍ ) is mental but the characterization ( ittiṣāf ) is external for secondary philosophical intelligibles. The occurrence ( ‘arūḍ ) and characterization ( ittiṣāf ) of secondary logical intelligibles are both mental.

The definitions and applications of the expressions ‘mental occurrence’ and ‘external occurrence’ and likewise the designations ‘philosophical concepts’ and ‘secondary intelligibles’ are controversial. We consider these only as technical terms and justify them as was mentioned. Characteristics of Each of the Types of Intelligibles The characteristic of logical concepts is that they apply only to mental concepts and forms, and consequently they are completely recognized with a little attention.