All the basic concepts of logic are of this group.

All the basic concepts of logic are of this group. The characteristic of whatish concepts is that they describe the whatnesses of things and specify the limits of their existence and are like empty frameworks for existents, and therefore they may be defined as conceptual frameworks. These concepts are employed in various true sciences. The characteristic of philosophical concepts is that they are not obtained without comparison and intellectual analysis.

When they are applied to existents they describe types of existents (not their whatish limits), such as the concept of cause, which corresponds to fire but never specifies its specific essence, but describes the kind of relation it has with fire, which is the relation of having an effect, a relation which also exists among other things.

Sometimes this characteristic is interpreted in such a way that philosophical concepts have no entified referents, or their occurrence is mental, although this interpretation is controversial and requires justification and explication. All pure philosophical concepts are of this group. Another characteristic of philosophical concepts is that there are no particular concepts or ideas for them.

For example, it is not the case that in our minds there is a particular form of causality and a universal concept, and likewise for the concept of effect, and other philosophical concepts. On the other hand, every universal concept for which there is a sensory, imaginary, or prehensive ( wahmī ) idea, such that the difference between them is only in universality and particularity, then it will be a whatish concept, not a philosophical concept.

It is to be noted that the opposite of this characteristic does not generally hold of whatish concepts, that is, it is not the case that for every whatish concept there is a sensory, imaginary or prehensive form. For example, the concept ‘soul’ is a species concept and a whatish concept, there is no particular mental form of it, and its instance can only be intuited by presentational knowledge.

Respectival (I‘tibārī) Concepts The term i‘tibārī (respectival) , which frequently encountered in philosophical discussions, is employed with various meanings and is really equivocal. One must take care to distinguish among its meanings so as not to confuse them or make mistakes. In one sense, all secondary intelligibles, whether logical or philosophical, are called i‘tibārī , and even the concept of existence is counted as i‘tibārī .