However...
However, regarding the fact that motion is continuous, and whatever is continuous may be infinitely divided into parts, potential parts of it may be taken into consideration in the sense that if, for example, a single motion were divided into two halves, in such a way that a specific midway point appeared, the amount of each of the two parts of the motion would be equal to one half of the amount of the entire motion.
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that this way of viewing potential existence for the parts of motion, is other than the way the potentiality of an earlier part was viewed with respect to a later part. The same point applies to type thirteen (accidental motion), although normally the expressions ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ are applied to substantial existents, even though potentiality as a dispositional quality ( kayf isti‘dādī ) is considered to be a kind of accident.
Types eight, nine and ten may be considered like types one, two and three, with the difference that in types eight, nine and ten substantial subjects may be considered to be potential with regard to the attribution of accidents. Likewise types eleven and twelve as well as fourteen and fifteen may be considered analogous to types four and five.
It may be concluded that for all the types of change except for the first three, the changed thing may be considered potential and that into which it changes may be considered actual. Indeed, the basis of the position of those who deny the existence of these three types is that they consider change to be equal to a transfer from the potential to the actual. Therefore it is necessary to investigate this problem to see whether instances can be found for the three above-mentioned posits.
Infinite Regresses of Material Events In the language of philosophy, it is well known that every material phenomenon is preceded by matter and time. A general requirement of this principle is that the appearance of a material existent from pure nothingness is considered to be impossible. Accordingly, the first and third of the fifteen types of change will be denied.
Since prime matter is considered to possess infinite potentiality, an infinite regress of events extending into the future is considered to be possible, the occurrence of which is proven on the basis of absolute divine grace and the absence of stinginess in the higher sources ( mabādī ‘āliyah ), which imply the denial of the second type of change.