On the other hand...
On the other hand, the mutakallimīn and some of the philosophers, such as Mīr Dāmād, hold that the material world has a temporal beginning. In order to refute the hypothesis of an infinite regress of events into the past they rely on the claim that an infinite regress is invalid. Likewise, the above-mentioned claim is used to prove the temporal end of the material world.
Accordingly, this problem is related to the problem of the temporal creation of the world, even though there is no implication between them, and it is possible that one might hold that the world has no temporal beginning while at the same time holding that it is not impossible for a material existent to appear without a preexistent matter.
It is also possible for one to hold that the material world will exist eternally, without considering it impossible for a material phenomenon to be destroyed entirely, positing the infinite series of events from pre-eternity to post-eternity on the basis of constant divine generosity. Here we will first investigate the principle of ‘the necessity of the priority of matter for every material phenomenon’ and then we will refer to the problem of the temporal eternity and creation of the world.
The Principle of the Necessity of the Priority of Matter to Material Events It was previously indicated that on the basis of innumerable observations, various transformations are always taking place in material things, and new phenomena replace the previous phenomena, so that the relation of potentiality and actuality occurs among them.
However, complete induction with regard to all material events is not possible, for no human being has existed from the beginning of the world and no one has yet experienced the end of the world. One cannot discover the definite cause of the priority of matter from the cases which have been observed and consider this principle to be an empirical one. For this reason, philosophers have sought to establish this principle rationally, as with the following proof.
Prior to becoming an existent, every material phenomenon has a possibility for existence; if there were not such a possibility the assumed phenomenon would be either a necessary or an impossible existent. Since this possibility is not substantial, there must be a substance to which the possibility is attributed, and this is what is called ‘matter.’ So, the priority of matter for every material phenomenon is necessary. Several aspects of this explanation are debatable.