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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Philosophical Instructions Lesson Twenty-Eight: Unity and Multiplicity Remarks on Some Issues Pertaining to Whatnesses Essential concepts are either simple or compound.

Two simple whatish concepts naturally cannot have a common aspect and will be completely distinct from one another, for it is supposed that there is a common aspect between them, which would be their own simple whatness, so that there would be no other aspect by which they could be distinguished, then they would not be numerically distinct and there would not be more than a single whatness.

If it is supposed that in addition to their common aspect each of them has a distinguishing aspect, then each of them would be composed of two whatish aspects, which is contrary to the supposition that they are simple. So, two simple whatish concepts must be distinct in their entirety ( bi tamām al-dhāt ). However, if one or both of them are compound, they may be supposed to have different forms.

In classical logic, compound whatnesses have at least two parts, one common part called the genus, which is a vague and indeterminate concept, obtained through comparison ( tardīd ) among several different species, and one specific part called the difference , which causes the determination of the genus (to a single species).

It is said that the whatness of man is composed of the concept of ‘animal’ and the concept of ‘rational,’ the first of which is common between the species of animals, and the second of which is the specific difference of man. The concept of genus, in turn, can also be compound, having a higher and more general genus, as the concept of ‘body’ includes animal, vegetable and mineral. But the concepts of differences are considered simple and incapable of being compound.