Finally...

Finally, for all compound whatnesses, ten highest simple genera, or ten ‘categories’ are supposed, as follows: substance ( jawhar ), quantity ( kamiyyah ), quality ( kayfiyyah ), relation ( iḍāfah ), posture ( waḍ‘ ), spatial locus ( ayna ), temporal locus ( mata ), possession ( jadah ), action ( an yaf‘al ) (states of gradual effects), passion ( an yanfa‘il ) (states of being affected passively and gradually).1 Regarding the number of the categories (the highest genera), and whether they are all really whatish concepts (first intelligibles), or at least whether some of them (such as relation and categories which are composed of relational concepts) are secondary intelligibles, there is controversy among the philosophers, but we shall not consider this matter further.

According to the logical apparatus of genus and difference, and based upon [the idea that] all compound whatnesses lead to some categories, they may be distinguished in two ways. One is a distinction among them in their entirety, and that is when two whatnesses pertaining to two categories are compared there is not even a common genus between them, for example, the concept of man and the concept of whiteness.

Secondly, their distinction may be partial, in case two whatnesses are compared from a single category, for example, the concept of horse and the concept of cow, which are common in animality, corporeality, and substantiality. It may be concluded that whole whatnesses (species), if simple, will be distinguished and distinct from each other in their entirety; likewise if they are compound and from two categories.

Also differences and highest genera, which are all considered to be simple concepts, are distinguished from one another in their entireties. No genus may be supposed to include all whatnesses. Therefore, there is not even one whatish element which can be considered to be common among all whatnesses.

On the other hand, the concept of existence, which is a secondary philosophical intelligible, is considered to be a simple, determinate, general and absolute concept which when added to a whatness individuates and limits it. The concept of existence specified and limited in this way is called a ‘share’ ( ḥissah , lit. also ‘part,’ ‘quotient’) of the universal concept of existence.