This is the same topic which was used to establish the...

This is the same topic which was used to establish the specific graduation of existence. Knowledge of the Causal Relation The causal relation, as analyzed and studied here, is specific to the creating cause and its effect, and does not include preparatory or material causes.

At this point, two questions may be raised, one about how one can know the above-mentioned relation between creative agents and their effects, and the other about how one can prove causal relations among physical things which are preparatory causes and effects.

Earlier it was indicated that man discovers some of the instances of cause and effect within himself by means of knowledge by presence, and when he considers the direct actions of the self, and compares such things as willing and the acquiring of mental concepts with his self, and he finds them to be dependent on the self, he abstracts the concept of cause and applies it to the self and he abstracts the concept of effect and applies this to the actions of the self.

So, he observes, for example, that his willing to do some deed depends upon specific cases of conceptual ( taṣawwurī ) and propositional ( taṣdīqī ) knowledge, and until such cognitions are realized, the act of willing is not produced by the self. By observing this sort of dependency which exists between knowledge and willing, the concepts of cause and effect may be further expanded so that the concept of effect may be applied to everything which has some sort of dependence upon another.

Likewise, the concept of cause is generalized to everything on which something else depends in some manner. In this way, the general concepts of cause and effect take shape. In other words, the finding of instances of cause and effect disposes the self to abstract universal concepts from them so as to include similar individuals, which is characteristic of universal concepts, as was explained in the discussion of epistemology.

For example, the concept of cause which is abstracted from the self is not in respect of its specific existence, and not in respect of its being itself, but because another existent depends upon it. So, any existent which is like this will be an instance of the concept of cause, whether it is material or immaterial, contingent or necessary.

Likewise, the concept of effect, which is abstracted from willing or any other phenomenon, is not so because it possesses a specific existence or whatness, but rather because it is dependent upon another existent.