An existent which is in need of another existent in its...

An existent which is in need of another existent in its reality and existence is an effect and the existence of an effect without the existence of its cause is impossible. Therefore, the existence of effect necessitates the existence of its cause. The existence of cause is either the Necessary Being by essence or the Possible Being by essence. In the first case, it is sought after, proved and attained, and in the second case, the existence of a cause is an effect of another existent.

If an existent whose cause is its effect is the very effect, a vicious cycle of arguments is inevitable. That is, a thing is the cause as well as the effect of another thing. There is no doubt that the cause comes first before the effect. A thing thus comes before (for being the cause) as well as after (for being an effect) another thing. This coming before ( taqaddum ) and after ( ta’akhkhar ) also exists in a thing; that is its very existence.

As a result, there arises a contradiction which is essentially and axiomatically impossible. In other words, the effect of the effect of a thing is its effect, just as the cause of the cause of a thing is its cause. Here, A is the effect of B and B is the effect of A. Therefore, A is the effect of A; that is, the existence of A comes before (for being the cause) as well as after (for being an effect) its essence, and it is a clear contradiction [of thinking].

If an existent whose cause is another existent other than the effect and this existent is an effect of yet another existent, and this process continues ad infinitum such that it does not end in the Existent that is not an effect, this necessitates the existence of an unbroken chain of cause and effect which is rationally impossible likewise.

This is because in this case, all existents are possible beings and are in need [of causes prior to their existence], and on the other hand, the existent in need [of a prior cause] will not exist without another existent which gives existence to it. Therefore, the concomitance of circular argument is that no existent will come into being and this is false and contrary to the first premise.

And if we consider their existence incontrovertible and at the same time deny the existence of their cause, we have actually denied the principle of causation. The assumption of an unbroken chain of cause and effect is like the case of infinite lamps that have spontaneously acquired light from nowhere; that is an effect without a cause.