From the above assertion...

From the above assertion, it becomes clear that the argument of possibility and necessity is a rational analysis and synthesis about reality and existence, and its point of beginning is the acceptance of the principle that reality ( wāqi‘iyyah ) can be divided into two, viz. necessary ( wājib ) and possible ( mumkin ). And in both cases, the object of desire ( wājib al-wujūd bi ’dh-dhāt or the Necessary Being by essence) can be proved [to be logically true].

In the first argument, therefore, the states and attributes of the existents, through whose contingency, order and movement the existence of God is asserted, are not examined. It is true that the attribute of ‘possibility’ ( imkān ) is also mentioned in this argument, but this attribute, like the attribute of ‘necessity’ ( wujūb ), is attained through rational analysis and not through sensory observation and pondering over natural creatures.

For this reason, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn has said: “If the theosophers had not also observed the existence of the tangible world, their belief concerning the existence of God, His Attributes and all His Actions would have been different from their existing belief.”[^2] Bertrand Russell’s Misgiving In his book Why Am I Not a Christian?

Bertrand Russell says: “The first rational argument in proving [the truth of] the existence of God is that everything that we can see in the world has a cause, and no matter how long this chain of causes takes, it must end up in the First Cause and finally this First Cause shall be called ‘God’.” In criticizing this argument, he then says: “If every thing must have a cause or reason, then the existence of God must have also a cause or reason, and if there is a thing which can exist without a cause or reason, disputing about the existence of God will be useless because the existence of nature is also possible without a cause.”[^3] Reply The reply to this misgiving is clear, provided that we acknowledge the value of reason in judging theoretical disputes, because in its rulings and judgments, reason follows fixed and categorical criteria and standards, and it will never issue a definite judgment unconscionably or on the basis of untenable criteria.

The criterion of the dictate of reason regarding causation – that is, an existent’s need for a cause – is that the existent is in a situation when existence and non-existence are equal in terms of its essence.