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Shiavault - a Vault of Shia Islamic Books Scepticism About Philosophy Rational Disagreement ======================== Here I consider at greater length the possibility of rational disagreement as a response to the problem. Consider two or more epistemic peers holding contrary views on the same issue. Can they each justifiedly believe either A or B? My epistemic peers disagree with me on this issue. I am right, but they are each wrong.

I am justified in holding my view, but they are not justified in holding theirs. My epistemic peers disagree with me on this issue. I am right, but they are each wrong. I am justified in holding my view, and they are also justified in holding theirs. If rational disagreement is possible, then sometimes it is justifiable for more than one member of a dispute to accept A, B, or something similar. In current epistemology, there is disagreement about whether rational disagreement is possible.

E.g., Richard Feldman argues that reasonable disagreement between peers is not possible under common circumstances, because there is generally at most a uniquely justified belief in light of a given set of evidence.[^9] Adam Elga holds that when one discovers that one disagrees with an epistemic peer, one should give the peers’ views equal weight as one’s own.[^10] David Christenson argues that when on has disagreement with peers, this typically should occasion belief-revision towards the views of one’s peers and vice versa.[^11] In contrast, Thomas Kelly holds that one often need not revise one’s views in light of discovering disagreement with one’s peers because one believes they have misjudged the evidence.[^12] Gideon Rosen holds that rationality is permissive and that sometimes one is permitted to choose among competing theories when given a set of evidence.[^13] Nicholas Rescher explicitly addresses the problem of philosophical dissensus.

He argues that philosophers choose to reject different theses—and thus establish conflicting schools of thought—because they accept different cognitive values or weigh the cognitive values differently. [^14] Cognitive values are the epistemic traits by which we assess a doctrine, e.g., coherence, plausibility, generality, importance, informativeness, elegance, etc.

A philosopher who more strongly values plausibility and intuitiveness is likely to accept different doctrines from those a philosopher who more strongly values systematicity would accept.