Rescher argues that differences over the relative weights of...

Rescher argues that differences over the relative weights of cognitive values cannot fully be resolved. According to Rescher, rational theory acceptance means accepting a theory that does justice to one’s cognitive values. Different theorists can reasonably accept different values to different degrees. So, rational disagreement is possible. It might be thought that the possibility of rational disagreement will bear on whether outsider scepticism is warranted in light of philosophical dissensus.

For instance, Peter van Inwagen discusses people who have heard philosophical debates but have remained agnostic.

He then says, I think that any philosophy who does not wish to be a philosophical sceptic…must agree with me that…it must be possible for one to be justified in accepting a philosophical thesis when there are philosophers who, by all objective and external criteria, are at least as equally well qualified to pronounce on that thesis and who reject it.[^15] However, it is possible that whether the agnostic should become a sceptic and whether the non-agnostic philosopher should become an agnostic sceptic are distinct problems.

📌Perhaps rational disagreement is possible among peers, and this excuses non-agnostic philosophers from having to become agnostic sceptics. However, as I will argue in this section, even if this is so, this does not give reason for the truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic to become a non-agnostic. Rather, she should be a sceptic about philosophy. Note that if rational disagreement were impossible, this would serve my thesis, as it would bolster the case for outsider scepticism.

If rational disagreement is impossible, then insiders (non-agnostic philosophers) should become sceptics. Presumably this means that outsiders (agnostics who have not studied philosophy) should become sceptics as well, once they learn that all the insiders are rationally obligated to become sceptics. However, I will assume for the sake of argument that rational disagreement among epistemic peers is possible.

I will argue that even if it is possible, this will not be enough to show the truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic that she ought to pursue philosophy and adopt any views. The possibility of rational disagreement does not defeat outsider scepticism. Since I am granting that rational disagreement is possible, I need not consider Rosen’s, Kelly’s, or others’ arguments for rational disagreement at length or with much precision.

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