Domínguez Caparrós (eds.

Domínguez Caparrós (eds.) Historia de la relación filosofía-literatura en sus textos, Suplementos de Anthropos, No. 32 (Barcelona: Anthopos, 1992), pp. 5-10, see p. [^8]: [^28] Poet, 1457b 6 and ff. [^29] I take the expression ‘creative discovery’ from M.C. Haley, The Semiosis of Poetic Metaphor Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), where a Peircian theory of poetic metaphor is explained. I think that it could be a valid translation of ‘aletheia praktike’.

[^30] Even our natural ability to catch surface similarities has phylogenetically evolved by means of creative activity and corrections, as authors like Popper or Quine have pointed out. See, for instance, K. Popper; A World of Propensities (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990); W.V. Quine, ‘Natural Kinds’, in W.V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 114-[^138]: [^31] Rhet 1412ª 10 and ff. [^32] Poet 1459a 5 and ff.

See also PN (464b 5 and ff.), where Aristotle wrote a beautiful passage on resemblance in dreams in the same purport as the previously quoted ones (it even contains a metaphor full of suggestions). [^33] In this sense, Scaltsas affirms that ‘similarity between substances cannot consist in the presence of a distinct (abstract) component in different substances. Rather, it consists in the derivation of the same distinct entity out of different substances’, in T.

Scaltsas, Substances & Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 197-[^8]: [^34] See Rhet 1405a 8 and ff. [^35] See Rhet 1411a 25 and ff. [^36] Rhet 1411b24-[^26]: The author is stressing the sensitive aspects of understanding in this passage.

Others exist in the same direction, for instance, those that establish the cognitive relevance of images: Aristotle affirms that we take delight in our senses, ‘and above all others the sense of sight’ (Meta 980a 21 and f.), and that never does the soul think without an image (DA 431a 14-17; PN 450a 1 and f.). Understanding is compared to the soul’s sight (EN 1096b 29), and, especially, active understanding to the light (DA 430a 14-17).

With regard to wise and prudent persons (phrónimos) we can read: ‘for because experience has given them an eye they see upright’ (EN 1143b 11-13). On cognitive functions of imagination for Aristotle, see also M.V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (London: Yale University Press, 1988); on perception, D.K.W.