The preponderant in the theoretical intellect field is...

The preponderant in the theoretical intellect field is ‘existential obligation’ which means a Necessary Being whereas the preponderant in the practical intellect field is moral necessitation which suggests legislative constraint. Also the problem in the relationship between freedom and causality arises and originates from the confusion between the two theoretical and practical fields and judgement in each of the two fields with the criterions related to the other field.

I shall clarify the theory of moral obligation (constraint) in two main parts: In part one , I shall explain the generalities attributed to the theory of ‘moral obligation’ and elucidate and solve the problems (with regards to the relationship between causality and freedom).

In part two, I will discuss the conformity of this theory with The will and the acts of the Almighty The will and behaviour of human individual The will and behaviour of man in a community or the human society The moral responsibilities of the human individual towards his behaviour The moral responsibilities of the society towards the social and individual behaviour The moral responsibilities of the Prophets, the parents, the teachers and mentors towards the personality and behaviour of man The changeability of the personality of man Part one: The generalities of the theory of moral obligations or constraints I shall explain the generalities of the moral obligations or constraints with regards to the freedom of man in the philosophical prospective through answering a number of fundamental questions: First it is necessary to point out the area of disagreement.

As it was clarified in the previous discussions, the pivotal point of the philosophical criticism is not in the behaviour arising from the will, desire and tendency.

This is because of the fact that the behaviour of man or any other voluntary agent arises from his will, desires and tendencies as well as the fact that the deterministic nature of the relationship between the will of the voluntary agent and his acts are not in contradiction with the free will of the voluntary agent and certainly there is no conflict between the necessity derived from freewill and the free will itself.

This matter is rather considered as the main subject and its validity is assumed certain. The centre of discussion is in the origin and source of origination of what is defined as ‘will’ or ‘determination’ in the connection between ‘will or determination’ with that ‘origin and source’.