Here, three basic questions exist: The first question is...

Here, three basic questions exist: The first question is whether ‘the will and determination of the act’ has any reason and cause in the voluntary agent or does it come into existence without any cause and reason? Is will and determination, which is the origin of the issue and emergence of the ‘voluntary act’, dominated by the ‘law of deterministic causality’?

Or does the ‘law of deterministic causality’ not include origination of ‘will and determinism of an act’ in the voluntary agent and as a result, has the general causality law considered the origin of the act of the voluntary agent as an exception? The second question is: assuming there is no exception in the ‘general causality law’ and considering that it includes the ‘act of the voluntary agent’, of what form will its comprehensiveness and incorporation be?

Is it possible to suppose the incorporation of the general causality law with regards to the act of the voluntary agent in a way that the voluntary nature of the act will not be altered? If it is possible, then how?

The third question is: assuming that it is possible to demonstrate an intellectual impression of the compliance and compatibility between the sovereignty of the general causality law and the voluntary nature of the act of the voluntary agent; is this compliance and compatibility enough for solving the problems originating from withdrawing will from the agent?

Will problems such as those arising from withdrawing moral responsibilities in ‘rejection of entitlement to the punishments and rewards of this world and those pertaining to the afterlife’ and ‘the equality between the righteous and the felon (offender) in the values of moral criterions’ be solved with the compliant demonstration of the causality law and the voluntary nature of the voluntary agent?

To answer these three questions, I shall first explain the passage of formation of the voluntary act and then separately explain and analyse in detail the answer to each question. As it was quoted in the previous discussions from the Islamic and eastern philosophers, it is possible to summarize the meaning of a ‘free agent’ or ‘voluntary agent’ in this conditional clause: ان شاء فعل و ان لم يشاء لم يفعل Translation: ‘He will do it if he wants to, and he will not do it if he does not want to’.

The main topic of discussion is how the condition in this clause, ‘if he wants to’ is accomplished?