So, it would be enough clear that in this context "evil"...

So, it would be enough clear that in this context "evil" could not be used in the first sense mentioned by Sadra. [^12]: It is worth noting that some of Muslim philosophers trace this theory to Plato.

Mirdamad, for example, after mentioning TNNE writes: " … and this is a principle by means of which Plato, the theosopher, refuted the doubt instilled by the dualists in order to prove two creators; the creator of goods and that of evils." Mirdamad, 1374, p.434) [^13]: I mean by "metaphor" here what we may call "philosophical metaphor" in contrast to "linguistic metaphor".

This idea is grounded in the philosophical consideration that we sometimes attribute the property of one thing to another because of the close connection between the two things. To present a simple (and inaccurate) example, we may call a certain syrup "sweet" while the thing which is really sweet is the sugar dissolved in the liquid. [^14]: In the contemporary philosophy of religion, evil is normally divided into two main kinds: natural evil and moral evil.

Moral evils result directly or indirectly from immoral actions. War, murder, and torture are examples of moral evil. On the contrary, natural evils, like diseases, floods and volcanoes (or, more accurately, the sufferings caused by natural phenomenon) do not follow immoral actions. Of course, the contrast between these two kinds is not always clear. For more discussion see: (Taliferro, 1998, p. 301). According to Leibniz, evil emerges in three main forms: metaphysical, physical and natural.

Sometimes, a fourth kind is added i.e., the emotional evil, which is thought of to be identical with suffering and pain. [^15]: Sadra elsewhere cites this claim with some hesitations: It is firmly possible to claim that this subject is selfevident and the mentioned examples were just for admonition." See: (Mulla Sadra, 1981, p. 62). There are other philosophers who believe that TNNE is self evident (c.f. Mirdamad, 1374, p. 428 and Al-Nuri Al-Zinuzi, 1374, p. 410 and Al-Zinuzi, 1376, p. 478).

[^16]: For an example, see: (Al-Shirazi, p. 520) [^17]: Sadra summarizes this argument and reveals its main logical form: "And the form of this deductive argument in its natural order is this: If the evil were an existential entity, then the evil would be not evil; the consequent is false [because it is a contradiction], thus the antecedent is false too." (Ibid. p. 59) [^18]: By "apprehensional evil" I just mean any evil which consists in a kind of apprehension.